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Topics

Introduction

Realism and Formalism

(Example compensating differentials here:)

,

• Lujo Brentano: Abstracte und realistische Volkswirthe (1871).
• Arthur Spiethoff: The "Historical" Character of Economic Theories (1952).

Institutions and Economic Performance

• Institutional Factors in Economic Performance:
  Weder-Brunetti
• The Factor C: Clark *
  See also Brentano (10 MB!) Schulze-Gävernitz (34 MB!)

• Colonial History and Economic Performance
  Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson
  Lange

Co-ordination

• Property as a convention Maynard-Smith (1978, 141-5) *
• Evolutionary stability (ESS)
• Bourgeois Strategy *,
• Problem of multiplicity, problem of equilibrium selection
• Focal points  *, , ,

• Small numbers, norms, generalization

• Context dependency of solutions to coordination conflicts:
• Entitlements and Obligations, Moralistic aggression *Schlicht Ch. 2

• Lock-ins, das Erosionsproblem *Schlicht Chs 3-5,

• Clarity, Rules and Schemata *Schlicht Chs 6-7
• Rule preference *Schlicht Ch.  8
• Video relating to the  commitment topic, supplied by Jason Jin. Have also a look at some further optical illusions.

• Rule preference *Schlicht Ch. 8
• Video relating to the  commitment topic, supplied by Jason Jin. Have also a look at some further optical illusions.

• Commitment, Obedience and authority, Endowment effect, Konformismus
• Stanford prison experiment

• Attribution, Self-Attribution, Over-Justification,  Cognitive Dissonance *Schlicht Ch. 9

• Emotion und Kognition *Schlicht Ch..10

• Humes Counterpoint
• Stabilty, general inflexible rules
• Status-quo preference
• Occupation
• Prescription
• Accession
• Succession
• Voluntary transfer of property
• Rituals
• Long-term contracts

• Vagueness in social categories
• The Firm as a collection of assets Moore* Sections 1-3
• Coase*

• Alchian und Demsetz* , Stiglitz

• Factory discipline

• Consistency in organization: Schlicht*

• Centralization Paradox (Williamson's Puzzle)

• Labour management
• Co-determination

• Non-Profits

• Coase *
• Aivazian and Callen *, *

• The iteration argument *, *, *, *

• Edgeworth-Conjecture ,
• Marx Capital Vol I Ch. 1 (English) (German)

• Smith Book I Ch. 4

• Alchian *
• Targets of selection: groups, individuals, genes
• Altruism and group selection *

• Corporate culture *

• Patterned variation *

• Notes on evolutionary psychology ,
• Notes on bounded rationality

Concluding Remarks