| 
 
  
    Economic Analysis and Organized Religion
by 
Ekkehart Schlicht 
In: Vernon
    Reynolds and Eric Jones (eds.), Survival and Religion: Biological Evolution and Cultural
Change, Chichester:
    John Wiley 1995 
 
Introduction
Economics tends to view institutions as optimal responses
to scarcities, environmental conditions, incentive problems, and so forth. Many
religious institutions appear, however, bizarre and wildly inefficient. Yet
these institutions seem important, influence human behavior, and are remarkably
stable. This poses a problem for economic analysis and highlights its general
quandary over integrating cultural factors in a non-trivial way. We may hope to
enhance our understanding of the culture-economics interface by studying the
particularly salient cultural phenomenon of religious organization. This
provides the motivation for this essay. 
The recent literature on the economics of religion provides
an excellent starting point, but it systematically sidesteps questions about the
nature of religious activity.
It takes the specifics of demand and supply for religion simply as given. In
this, it must remain ad hoc, and
obliged to remain silent about the culture-economics issue. By treating the
market for religion just like the market for apples, we will certainly find many
features that these markets have in common, but since we exclude cultural
considerations, we will be incapable of dealing with them; they will escape our
analysis just like a stealth bomber escapes the enemy's radar. In order to spot
something, we must employ other instruments. I shall thus draw on arguments from
social psychology in addition to using economic tools in order to address the
problems of economic-cultural interaction. By doing so, we may also find some
footing for our assumptions about demand and supply, from which the features of
religious organization emanate; these will appear less ad
hoc. 
Religion is certainly an extremely interesting topic in its
own right, and this justifies its analysis. I think, however, that an analysis
of religion from the point of view of economics is of much broader significance
for economics and social theory in general. Let me just stress two aspects. 
Religion as
Freewheeling Superstructure. The interface between culture and economics or
law and economics is of particular importance with regard to our understanding
of the formation of economic institutions. Although it seems that the
effectiveness of economic organization depends crucially on organizational
features, economics is silent about all that. Applying standard economic
analysis it could be easily argued that making civic rights salable will
increase economic welfare for everybody; or that socialism is as efficient as
capitalism if only the competences and responsibilities of the functionaries are
sharply defined; or that institutions really do not exist but are only
"legal fictions". All this points to a fundamental weakness of
economics with regard to cultural phenomena where it is absolutely imperative to
improve our understanding in order to come to grips with quite obvious
efficiency aspects of economic organization on a theoretical level. To
understand, however, how the superstructure affects economic performance, we
need to know how the superstructure itself works. The easiest case is the case
of freewheeling superstructures, or superstructures that are not too closely
tied to economic exigencies. Several topics come to mind here: For just that
reason Claude Lévi-Strauss (1964-71;
1967) has taken mythology as his object of study. More closely related to
organizational questions are, however, phenomena of organized religion and
organized sports activities, and the systems of rules evolving there. One reason
for being concerned with religion is, thus, that I take it as an instance of a
partially autonomous superstructure that I would like to understand in order to
draw lessons with regard to economic organization. 
Religion as
a Testing Ground for Models of Man. The application of economic analysis to
religious phenomena may reveal the limits of economic analysis and may, at the
same time, highlight aspects of human nature that economists neglect. Since
religious activity is so important in almost all cultures, it is a feature any
theory of man must account for, and I find it most unsatisfactory to assume that
most of the people are most of the time ridiculously foolish and superstitious.
Although I do not subscribe to the economists' assumption that human beings are always rational and selfish, I do not think either that they are never
selfish and cunning, nor do I think that human beings are systematically
schizophrenic in being always virtuous in some activities and self-seeking in
others. I would like to start from a model of man that encompasses all these
features in a coherent way - or else I would know in fact that my theories rest
on wrong assumptions to begin with. It seems to me, thus, that the combination
of mundane economics and otherworldly religion is a particularly demanding
testing ground for any model of man.
Before developing a theory, as before developing an automobile, it may be
advisable to invest in a suitable testing ground in order to be able later on to
do some testing. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In the first part I
review briefly why and in what sense economic arguments are applicable to the
analysis of organized religion. Parallels between the formation of firms and
churches are stressed. Both are rooted in specialization and the division of
labor. They rely on routines that have proved successful (in some evolutionary
sense), and so forth. 
In the second part I turn to some characteristics of
religious activity that may help us to understand various specific features in
the supply of and demand for religion. The central idea here is that religious
activity is rooted in the desire of men to understand the world and their own
place therein, and to justify their actions and make moral judgements. This
"quest for sense" is however not confined to religious activity but
permeates many aspects of culture. As the second part is written under the
presumption that it presents fairly new material to the reader, I found it
necessary to elaborate and illustrate the argument quite extensively. 
In the third part, I turn to very specific questions: Why
do we find specialization in religious activity, what determines the product mix
offered by the churches, and why do we find monopolistic market structures, with
a few big churches dominating the market and sects as small specialized
suppliers? What explains why the churches do not charge for their services
individually but rather finance themselves through tax-like contributions, and
how does all this relate to the "quest for sense" or to other motives
and functions of religious activity? 
The last part of the paper deals with a problem of
notorious difficulty in institutional analysis: The problem of inefficient but
persistent institutional arrangements. This pertains to the general question of
whether religion matters in the sense that it really influences human behavior
in a significant way. In many ways this seems not to be the case. Religions are
adaptive and malleable in many ways. It is hard to detect instances where
religion drives behavior directly, and not merely as an intervening variable. We
find however inefficient, and even harmful, religious practices like male and
female circumcision that can hardly be interpreted as optimal institutional
solutions as brought about by evolution unless the specific nature of religious
activity is taken into account. 
In conclusion it is argued that those features of religious
organization which pose problems for economic analysis suggest at the same time
that the "quest for sense", as crystallized in interpretations,
religions and other cultural phenomena, should be seen as a independent driving
force of societal processes. It may be very weak as compared to other forces,
but it may work cumulatively over the long term. 
  
Keywords: economics of religion, religion and competition,
division of labour in religion, institutional economics and religion 
  
   
  
      
  More precisely, economists would not deny that inefficient institutions may
  exist and may be stable in some sense, but would not say that no institution
  is totally rigid; its rules are somewhat fuzzy, and there is continuous social
  experimentation going on, deliberately or by mistake, and Darwinian
  competition between institutional forms will ultimately supersede inefficient
  institutions by more efficient variants. Although this view has its critics
  even within economics, it seems to be the only game in town with regard to
  institutional theorizing. 
  
  
  [2]    
  Surveys of recent contributions to the economic analysis of religion may be
  found in Laurence Iannacone and Brooks Hull (1991) and Dieter Schmidtchen and
  Achim Mayer (1973).. 
  
  
  
 
    
       Aufsatz 
 
 
 
 
 Professor Dr. Ekkehart Schlicht: Veröffentlichungen/Publications 
  
  
 | | | | | | | |  
 
 
 
 
 
		  | 
		
 
  
		 | 
		
 
   |